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I. INTRODUCTION
After several landmark corrective efforts by Congress and the
Supreme Court, interesting and important questions still remain un-
resolved concerning the standard disputes clause of government con-
tracts and the status of administrative determinations under that clause
during subsequent judicial actions.
Disputes clauses`, which have long been included in most govern-
ment contracts, serve two main purposes: first, they prevent the stop-
page of work pending the resolution of a dispute; and, second, they
provide a relatively inexpensive and rapid method of settling contro-
versies. In order to accomplish these objectives, the standard disputes
clause provides that disputes as to questions of fact arising under the
contract are to be decided by the contracting officer. The decision of
the contracting officer is final as to both parties, but the contractor has
a right of appeal which may be exercised within thirty days. Once ap-
peal has been made to the head of the agency or his representative (the
Board of Contract Appeals), the resultant decision is final and binding
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on both parties, subject to the standards of review contained in the
Wunderlich Act'
It would appear from the all-inclusive language of this clause that
there is but one avenue of relief for a contractor, and that facts found
administratively with respect to a dispute would be binding, subject,
of course, to judicial review of the administrative record. This clause,
however, has not been so interpreted. Consequently, decisions regard-
ing the scope of the clause and the effect of administrative rulings
rendered thereunder have created considerable uncertainty and con-
fusion. This vagueness weakens the well-established policy of the
Government to settle, without expensive litigation, disputes arising
under its contracts.
It is the purpose of this article to examine some of the causes of
the existing problems and to suggest certain corrective actions which
would eliminate many of these causes. Particular emphasis will be
placed on two recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.'
II. BACKGROUND
A. Contractual Basis for Dispute Determination—Judicial Sanction
The Supreme Court has held that the parties to a contract may
provide for some designated person or persons, even if employed by
one of the contracting parties, to make final determinations of fact
which will be conclusive upon both parties.' A basic principle of gov-
ernment contract law, going back to Kihlberg v. United States,' is that
when both parties to the contract have entrusted the Government's con-
tracting officer with the power to settle disputes arising between the
parties, the contracting officer's decision shall be final and cannot be
rejected by a court unless it is shown that he acted fraudulently, failed
to exercise honest judgment, or was so grossly mistaken as necessarily
to imply bad faith.
In United States v. Joseph A. Holpuch Co.,' the Court held that
unless a contractor has pursued the administrative remedy of appeal
granted by the disputes clause, he will not acquire standing to sue in
the Court of Claims.
The Court of Claims, apparently seeking equitable results in
particular cases, expanded the grounds for appeal established by the
Kihlberg decision. To the formula sanctioned by the Supreme Court,
the Court of Claims added the criterion that the departmental decision
1 68 Stat. 81 (1954), 41 U.S.C. *$ 321-22 (1964).
2 United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966); United States
v. Anthony Grace & Sons, 384 U.S. 424 (1966).
3 Kihlberg v. United States, 97 U.S. 398 (1878).
4 Ibid.
5 328 U.S. 234 (1946).
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must be supported by substantial evidence. The Supreme Court first
indicated its disapproval by a per curiam reversal in 1939 6 and again,
several years later, in United States v. Moorman.? Despite this ex-
plicit rejection by the Supreme Court, the Court of Claims continued
to follow its own criteria.'
In United States v. Wunderlich? the Supreme Court handed down
a ruling which might have been the final word on the subject of review
of government contract cases. Wunderlich held that decisions of gov-
ernment officers rendered pursuant to the standard disputes clauses in
government contracts are final absent fraud on the part of such gov-
ernment officers.")
B. The Wunderlich Act
Following the Wunderlich decision, Congress enacted what is
known as the Wunderlich Act." This act, in substance, provides that
the decision of the head of a department or a duly-authorized repre-
sentative or board "in a dispute involving a question arising under
[a government] . . . contract . . . shall be final and conclusive un-
less the same is fradulent [sic] or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly
erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or is not supported by
substantial evidence."' It also prohibits clauses which make the deci-
sion of a government officer final on questions of law arising under
the contracts.
In reporting favorably on the bill subsequently enacted, the House
Judiciary Committee said:
The purpose of the proposed legislation . . . is to over-
come the effect of the Supreme Court decision in the case of
United States v. Wunderlich . . . .
. 	 . 	 . 	 .
Prior to the Supreme Court decision in the Wunderlich
case it was generally understood that administrative decisions
8 United States v. John McShaine, Inc., 308 U.S. 512 (1939).
7 338 U.S. 457 (1950).
8 See, e.g., Wunderlich v. United States, 117 Ct. Cl. 92 (1950).
0 352 U.S. 98 (1951).
10 Id. at 100. The consequences expected to flow from the majority decision in
Wunderlich are described in two dissenting opinions. Mr. Justice Douglas' trenchant
protest warns that "the rule we announce . . . makes a tyrant out of every contracting
officer." Id. at 101. In a separate dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Jackson argued that
one who undertakes to act as a judge in his own case or, what amounts to the
same thing, in the case of his own department, should be under some fiduciary
obligation to the position which he assumes. He is not at liberty to make arbi-
trary or reckless use of his power, nor to disregard evidence, nor to shield his
department from consequences of its own blunders at the expense of contractors.
Id. at 103.
1 1 68 Stat. 81 (1954), 41 U.S.C. §§ 321-22 (1964).
12 68 Stat. 81 (1954), 41 U.S.C. § 321 (1964).
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rendered under the disputes clauses were final and would not
be reviewed by the courts unless the decision was fraudulent,
or arbitrary, or capricious, or so grossly erroneous as neces-
sarily to imply bad faith.
. . . .
The proposed amendment also adopts the additional
standard that the administrative decision must be supported
by substantial evidence. The requirement that administrative
action be supported by substantial evidence is found in the
Administrative Procedure Act . . . . As understood by the
Committee and as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Edi-
son Company v. Labor Relations Board (305 U.S. 197, 229)
"substantial evidence" means "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a con-
clusion.'"
The House Judiciary Committee's report of the bill indicates that
the purpose of the legislation was more than merely to overcome the
Supreme Court's Wunderlich decision. By adding the substantial evi-
dence test, Congress expected agencies to modify their administrative
hearing procedures so that a record would be available for judicial
review. Neither the Wunderlich Act nor the report, however, indicates
the nature of the judicial review to be given to administrative deci-
sions. 24
C. Judicial Review Subsequent to the Wunderlich Act
Following passage of the Wunderlich Act, the Court of Claims
held, in Wagner Whirler & Derrick Corp. v. United States,' that the
congressional intent was to restore the status quo ante the decision of
the Supreme Court in United States v. Wunderlich." What the Court
of Claims did not decide in the Wagner case was whether they would
restore their pre-Wunderlich policy of admitting de novo evidence
upon review. That question was decided in Valentine & Littleton v.
13 H.R. Rep. No. 1380, 83d Cong., 2d Sess 1-5 (1954).
14 The importance of the nature of the judicial review was called to the attention
of the House Judiciary Committee during hearings on the proposed legislation. Hearings
Before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 1st &
2d Sess. 51, 59, 79, 113 (1954). One witness had reservations about the use of the
substantial evidence test, "unless Congress provides appropriate legislation for setting
up administrative appeals found within all the procurement agencies and appropriate
legislation for conferring appellate jurisdiction on the Court of Claims and the district
courts, insofar as they act concurrently." Id. at 119. See generally Schultz, Proposed
Changes in Government Contract Disputes Settlement: The Legislative Battle Over the
Wunderlich Case, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 217 (1953).
16 128 Ct. Cl. 382, 121 F. Supp. 664 (1954).
18 Supra note 9.
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United States," where the Court of Claims explicitly held that restora-
tion of the status quo ante the Wunderlich decision must include the
court's admission of de novo evidence.
In Volentine, the contractor exhausted his administrative remedies
and a decision was issued. On appeal to the Court of Claims, the con-
tractor alleged that the decision was not valid because it was arbitrary,
capricious, fraudulent, and was not based on substantial evidence. He
introduced evidence tending to show that the Government had
breached its contract. The Government declined to introduce any evi-
dence, taking the position that the only evidence relevant to this stage
of the case was the administrative record, and the contractor had
failed to produce it." The Government argued that the Wunderlich
Act standards cannot be applied to an administrative decision unless
one knows the evidence on which the administrative decision was
based." The majority of the court rejected the Government's position:
It would require two trials in many cases involving this ques-
tion. The first trial would include the presentation of the
"administrative record" and its study to determine whether,
on the basis of what was in it, the administrative decision was
tolerable. But the so-called "administrative record" is in
many cases a mythical entity. There is no statutory provision
for these administrative decisions or for any procedure in
making dimly°
Judge Littleton's concurring opinion added that the Wunderlich
Act does not change the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims from a
court of original jurisdiction to an appellate court, nor does it give the
court jurisdiction to render an administrative rather than a judicial
decision.' As Judge Littleton pointed out, the court's jurisdiction in
contract suits is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1491, 22 and all suits brought
under that section are "in the nature of original proceedings based on
competent evidence adduced by both parties in open court."" The
Wunderlich Act, he asserted, is merely a statutory limitation on the
authority of contracting agencies to finalize their own decisions in con-
tract disputes.' In Judge Littleton's view, the administrative record
11 136 Ct. Cl. 638, 145 F. Supp. 952 (1956).
18 Id. at 641, 145 F. Supp. at 953.
19 Id. at 641, 145 F. Supp. at 954.
20 Id. at 641-42, 145 F. Supp. at 954.
21 Id. at 644, 145 F. Supp. at 955.
22 28 U.S.C. 1491 (1964) provides that the Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction
to render judgment "upon any claim against the United States founded . . . upon any
express or implied contract with the United States... ." See generally Jaffe, Standing to
Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1265, 1267-68 (1961).
23 136 Ct. Cl. at 644, 145 F. Supp. at 955.
24 Id. at 644-45, 145 F. Supp. at 955.
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was simply "former testimony" which may or may not be admissible
in evidence."
Judge Laramore's dissent agreed with the Government's position."
A "common sense application" of the Wunderlich Act, according to
his opinion, would be to
apply the usual administrative review rule and determine the
question of arbitrariness, etc., and lack of substantial evi-
dence on the record made before an appeals board, unless
the contractor alleges and proves that because of the proce-
dures available in the Appeals Board as applied to him, he
was unable to adequately present his case. That is to say,
because of the failure of the Government to produce docu-
ments or witnesses or inability of the plaintiff to compel the
attendance of witnesses or other procedures that would pre-
vent plaintiff from adequately establishing material facts
with reference to his claim, or if the board considered evi-
dence not in the record. Further, he must allege and prove
the additional material facts which were not before the
board. 27
III. THE BIANCHI CASE
In 1946, Carlo Bianchi contracted with the Corps of Engineers
for the construction of a flood-control dam, including a tunnel for the
diversion of water. After the tunnel had been drilled, Bianchi asserted
that unforeseen conditions had created extreme hazards for his work-
men, requiring permanent protection for them, and that the company
should be compensated." The contracting officer rejected the claim,
and an appeal was taken to the Board of Claims and Appeals of the
Corps of Engineers. An adversary hearing was held before this Board.
A record was kept, and each party offered its evidence and had an
opportunity to cross-examine. In December 1948, the Board issued a
decision against Bianchi.
In December 1954, Bianchi sued in the Court of Claims. He al-
leged breach of contract based upon the administrative rejection of
his "changed conditions" claim. Bianchi argued that the decisions of
the contracting officer and the Board were "capricious or arbitrary or
so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or were not
25 Id. at 649-50, 145 F. Supp. at 958.
26 Id. at 650, 145 F. Supp. at 959.
27 Id. at 650-51, 145 F. Supp. at 959.
28 The contract contained a standard "changed conditions" clause, authorizing the
contracting officer to provide for an increase in cost if the contractor encountered sub-
surface conditions materially different from those indicated in the contract or reasonably
to be anticipated.
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supported by substantial evidence." 29 In 1956, appearing before a
Commissioner of the Court of Claims, the Government contended that
the only evidence admissible on the question of whether the Board's
decision should be considered final was the administrative record made
below. The Commissioner accepted de novo evidence, made extensive
findings, and concluded that Bianchi was entitled to recover. In Janu-
ary 1959, the Court of Claims accepted the Commissioner's findings
and conclusions, ruling that "on consideration of all the evidence, the
contracting officer's decision [as affirmed by the Board] cannot be
said to have substantial support," and thus "does not have finality.""
The Supreme Court reversed,' holding "that in its consideration
of matters within the scope of the 'disputes' clause in the present case,
the Court of Claims is confined to review of the administrative record
under the standards in the Wunderlich Act and may not receive new
evidence."' In support of this conclusion, Mr. Justice Harlan states
that
this court long ago upheld the validity of clauses in govern-
ment contracts delegating to a government employee the au-
thority to make determinations of disputed questions of fact
. . . to be given conclusive effect in any subsequent suit in
the absence of fraud or gross mistake implying fraud or bad
faith .... Thus the function of the Court of Claims in mat-
ters governed by "disputes" clauses was in effect to give an
extremely limited review of the administrative decision . . . .
It is our conclusion that, apart from questions of fraud,
determination of the finality to be attached to a departmental
decision on a question arising under a "disputes" clause must
rest solely on consideration of the record before the depart-
ment. This conclusion is based both on the language of the
statute [the Wunderlich Act] and on its legislative history."
Mr. Justice Harlan notes that the Wunderlich Act "is designated
as an Act 'To permit review' and that the reviewing function is one
ordinarily limited to consideration of the decision of the agency or
court below and of the evidence on which it was based."" His opinion
goes on to state:
2° See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
80 Carlo Bianchi & Co. v. United States, 144 Ct. Cl. 500, 506, 169 F. Supp. 514,
517 (1959).
31 United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709 (1963).
82 Id. at 718.
88 Id. at 713-14.
84 Id. at 714-15.
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Indeed, in cases where Congress has simply provided
for review, without setting forth the standards to be used or
the procedures to be followed, this Court has held that con-
sideration is to be confined to the administrative record and
that no de novo proceeding may be held . . . . National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 227
[1943] . . . . [T]he function of reviewing an administra-
tive decision can be and frequently is performed by a court
of original jurisdiction as well as by an appellate tribunal."
The majority points out that the standards of review in the Wun-
derlich Act have
frequently been used by Congress and have consistently been
associated with a review limited to the administrative record
.. . . The term "substantial evidence" . . . goes to the
reasonableness of what the agency did on the basis of the evi-
dence before it, for a decision may be supported by substan-
tial evidence even though it could be refuted by other
evidence that was not presented to the decision-making
body." (Footnote omitted.)
Although legal scholars expressed some hope that Bianchi might
end the "confusion in the courts,' the case failed to resolve the
difference of opinion between the Court of Claims and the Supreme
Court. The Court of Claims continued its pre-Bianchi procedure of
holding de novo hearings, until the Supreme Court handed down two
recent decisions: United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co." and
United States v. Anthony Grace & Sons."
IV. THE UTAH CASE
The contract in Utah was between the United States, acting
through the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), and the Utah Con-
struction and Mining Company. It contained the standard disputes
clause providing for the resolution by the contracting officer of "all
disputes concerning questions of fact arising under this contract." It
35 Id. at 715.
36 Ibid. This statement of the substantial evidence test should be compared with
the application of the test by the Court of Claims. See, e.g., Volentine & Littleton, supra
note 17, where the Court of Claims decided whether the substantial evidence test was
met only after admitting de novo evidence.
87 Compare Harrison, Eight Years After Wunderlich—Confusion in the Courts, 28
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 561 (1960), with Schultz, Wunderlich Revisited: New Limits on
Judicial Review of Administrative Determination of Government Contract Disputes,
29 Law Sr Contemp. Prob. 115 (1964).
38 384 U.S. 394 (1966).
39 384 U.S. 424 (1966).
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provided further for an appeal to the duly authorized representative
of the Commission, "whose decision shall be final and conclusive upon
the parties."
Work on the contract was completed on January 7, 1955. During
and subsequent to the performance of the contract, Utah had sub-
mitted to the contracting officer various claims for relief. All but four
of these claims were settled." In three of the unsettled claims, Utah
had requested extensions of time and compensation for increased, costs,
including costs incurred by reason of delays caused by the Govern-
ment. This relief was sought under the "changed conditions" and "de-
lays-damages" clauses of the contract." Utah sought relief for the
fourth claim under the "changes" clause of the contract.' Three of
these claims were heard before a panel of the AEC's Advisory Board
of Contract Appeals. This Board heard each claim at a hearing on the
record, with exhibits,-briefs, testimony, cross-examination, and argu-
ment. Jurisdiction was noted in each instance, and decisions were
rendered with full discussion and findings. The fourth claim was heard
on appeal by an AEC hearing examiner," who decided that the claim
by Utah was untimely."
In 1961, approximately six and one-half years after the events
under the contract occurred, Utah entered the Court of Claims to sue
the United States for damages. In its petition, Utah alleged substan-
tially the same facts as those which had supported its claims for ad-
42 The four controversies were appealed to the AEC Advisory Board of Contract
Appeals, which was at that time the designated representative of the AEC for hearing
appeals under the disputes clause. These claims were designated in the litigation as the
"pier drilling" claim, the "concrete aggregate" claim, the "shield window" claim, and the
"shield door" claim.
41 Under the "changed conditions" clause, the contracting officer must grant addi-
tional time to the contractor and reimburse him for costs resulting either from subsurface
or latent conditions differing from those shown in the contract specifications or from
unknown conditions of an unusual nature. This clause imposes certain notice require-
ments on a contractor.
If a contractor fails to complete his work on time, and the delay results from
specified causes beyond his control, the "delays-damages" clause allows additional time
and excuses the contractor from liquidated damages.
42 This clause calls for an equitable adjustment in the contract price and an ex-
tension in the time for performance, if the changes ordered by the contracting officer
in the drawings or specifications add to the cost or time of performance.
43 The hearing examiner appeal procedure temporarily replaced the Advisory Board
of Contract Appeals in 1959. AEC Rules of Procedure in Contract Appeals, 24 Fed. Reg.
726 (1959) (superseded September 11, 1964). Under the new procedure, contract appeals
were heard by a hearing examiner, with discretionary review by the Commission. In
1964, the Commission returned to the use of a board for hearing contract appeals. Rules
of Procedure in Contract Appeals, 10 C.F.R. ¢% 3.1-.23 (Supp. 1966).
44 The claim before the hearing examiner was the "concrete aggregate" claim. See
note 40 supra. This claim was made three years after Utah became aware of the alleged
changed condition. The "changed conditions" clause required that the contracting officer
be notified immediately.
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ministrative relief. In addition, Utah asserted two claims, not asserted
administratively, for increased costs due to delay.
The case was referred to a Commissioner who directed the parties
to file briefs arguing the question of the extent to which he was bound
by the Bianchi decision. Utah contended that the claims it was present-
ing to the court did not "arise under" the contract within the meaning
of the standard disputes clause. Consequently, Bianchi did not bar a
de novo trial of the underlying facts. The Government asserted that
Utah's claims did fall within the disputes clause. It also argued that
Bianchi precluded a trial de novo as to relevant facts previously de-
termined pursuant to proper administrative disputes procedures. Any
review of such facts should be confined to a review of the administra-
tive record. The Commissioner ruled that Utah, with the exception of
one part of one claim, was entitled to a trial de novo."
The Government then sought review of the Commissioner's order
in the Court of Claims. The court ruled that the language providing an
administrative remedy for "disputes concerning questions of fact
arising under this contract" refers to "a dispute over the rights of the
parties given by the contract; it does not mean a dispute over a viola-
tion of the contract."'" Facts underlying claims for breach of contract
do not "arise under" the contract and are not within the scope of the
disputes clause.' Consequently, the court concluded that even though
these facts may have been properly resolved in an administrative pro-
ceeding under the disputes clause, they should not be accorded finality
in a suit for breach of contract. In such a suit, all facts have to be
determined de novo by the court.
There was a strong dissent on the ground that the administrative
determination of factual disputes, properly made with a full hearing
under the disputes clause, should be binding upon the parties in sub-
sequent actions for breach of contract's As to any relevant facts which
were not actually litigated and determined administratively, the dissent
agreed with the majority that the contractor should have a de novo
trial."
In March 1966, the case was argued before the Supreme Court.
The Justice Department claimed that the province of administrative
fact-finding under the disputes clause was very broad and did not
depend on whether such facts related directly to claims on which ad-
ministrative relief could be given under a specific contract clause. The
45 Commissioner's Order and Memorandum Re Applicability of Bianchi Decision,
filed February 16, 1964.
46 Utah Constr. & Mining Co. v. United States, 168 Ct. Cl. 522, 527, 339 F.2d 606,
610-11 (1964).
47 Id. at 528, 339 F.2d at 610.
48 Id. at 539, 339 F.2d at 617.
46 Id. at 537-38, 339 F.2d at 615-16.
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Court was asked to decide two issues: (1) whether factual disputes,
administratively resolved pursuant to the standard disputes clause of
government contracts, may be tried de novo by a court in a suit
for breach of contract; and, (2) whether factual disputes underlying
claims for breach of contract are generally subject to administrative
resolution under the standard disputes clause of government con-
tracts."
On June 6, 1966, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Utah,61
rejecting the contention of the Government that all factual findings
relating to government contracts had to be made administratively.
For the first time, the Court ruled that the disputes clause was manda-
tory in only those cases where administrative relief could be given
under specific contract adjustment provisions." The Court's decision
was based on
an examination of uniform, continuous, and long-standing
judicial and administrative construction of the disputes
clause . . . [which established] . . . that the jurisdiction
of the Boards of Contract Appeals under the disputes clause
was limited to claims for equitable adjustments, time exten-
sions, or other remedies under specific contract provisions
authorizing such relief and accordingly . . . the contractor
need not process pure breach of contract claims through the
disputes machinery before filing his court action."
Assuming, arguendo, that the clause is susceptible of the broad
interpretation given it by the Government, the Court said that the
question before it "is what the parties intended, not whether the con-
struction on which they relied was erroneous."" In view of the long-
established understanding that the disputes clause did not encompass
pure breach of contract claims (a claim for which there is no contrac-
tual basis for administrative relief), these parties could not have
understood the clause to include such claims." The Government con-
tended, however, that even though there is no administrative jurisdic-
tion to grant relief in breach of contract cases, the disputes clause
permits the administrative board to make binding fact findings which
would be reviewable under Wunderlich Act standards rather than de
novo. This argument was rejected."
The Court reversed the Court of Claims insofar as it failed to
541 Brief for Petitioner, p. 2.
61 384 U.S. 394 (1966).
52 Id. at 404.
63 Id. at 404-05.
54 Id. at 407.
55 Id. at 404.
56 Id. at 412.
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accept those fact findings properly made on the administrative level,
stating:
It would disregard the parties' agreement to conclude, as the
Court of Claims did, that because the court suit was one for
breach of contract which the administrative agency had no
authority to decide, the court need not accept administra-
tive findings which were appropriately made and obviously
relevant to another , claim within the jurisdiction of the
board."
V. THE ANTHONY GRACE CASE
The contract in the Anthony Grace ease" was initiated by an
invitation from the Department of the Air Force for bids on the con-
struction of military housing units. The bid form advised that wages
to be paid to laborers and mechanics would equal the prevailing wage
as determined by the Secretary of Labor not more than ninety days
prior to the commencement of construction. The form also explained
that any differences between the minimum wage schedule attached to
the invitation and the schedule finally issued by the Secretary of
Labor might require an adjustment of the bid price in an amount to
be determined by the Federal Housing Commissioner.
Grace submitted the low bid and was issued a Letter of Accept-
ability." Grace then requested the Secretary of Labor to make an
appropriate wage determination. The Secretary made two determina-
tions, one for general construction of the houses, the other for heavy
and highway construction. The latter rates were lower than those for
building construction. Grace contended that the determinations re-
quired it to pay the higher building construction rates for a greater
portion of the work than provided in the specifications. Both the Fed-
eral Housing Commissioner and the Air Force denied Grace's request
for an increase in contract price. Thereafter, Grace declined to begin
work until resolution of this dispute. The Air Force, acting pursuant
to the contract, cancelled the award. When Grace requested the return
of its bid deposit, the Air Force refused, and Grace filed a notice of
appeal.
The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals granted the
Government's motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely. Grace there-
after sued in the Court of Claims for damages for breach of contract.
Grace's position was that the wage determinations of the Secretary of
Labor constituted a breach of contract because they unilaterally altered
57 Id. at 419.
58 Supra note 39.
59 The invitation provided that "upon issuance of the Letter of Acceptability" the
bidder "becomes obligated to carry out its terms within the times therein stated."
12
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the provisions of the specifications defining the scope of the work to
be performed by the higher paid building construction personnel.
The Commissioner of the Court of Claims, after finding that the
appeal to the Armed Services Board was timely, held that there were
factual issues remaining to be tried in the case, and that Bianchi'
was inapplicable because Grace's claim involved an alleged breach of
contract and hence was not covered by the disputes clause.
Upon review of the Commissioner's findings, the Court of Claims
agreed that the administrative appeal was timely. However, there was
disagreement on the question of whether the case should be returned
to the administrative board for a hearing or retained for a judicial trial.
The majority held that the case should be retained, relying on prior
decisions' which held that "failure of the contracting officer to per-
form his adjudicatory functions" entitled the contractor to "immediate
resort to the courts."' A stay of judicial proceedings to permit admin-
istrative findings is warranted, in the opinion of the majority, only
"where the suspension will actually expedite handling of the litigation
or where the Supreme Court has indicated that a stay of court pro-
ceedings is justified."' The court did not believe that Bianchi was
applicable since that case did not involve "a situation where a contract
appeals board . . . refused jurisdiction."" According to the court,
Bianchi expressed a policy against delay in government contract litiga-
tion, and, in the instant case, this policy required a judicial rather than
an administrative trial of the facts.'
On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court addressed itself to the
issue of "whether a reviewing court which rules that factual disputes
should have been resolved administratively pursuant to a standard
government disputes clause may nonetheless require that they be re-
solved in a judicial trial rather than administratively." 66
The Government contended that the Court of Claims decision
violated the Wunderlich Act, and that the Bianchi decision committed
questions of fact under the disputes clause to administrative determi-
nation, subject, of course, to judicial review.
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Claims," holding that
the Board of Contract Appeals—not the reviewing court—should make
the original record on an issue which the Board did not resolve be-
60 Supra note 31.
61 170 Ct. Cl. at 692-94, 345 F.2d at 810-12.
62 Id. at 693-94, 345 F.2d at 812.
Os Id. at 695, 345 F.2d at 812.
64 Id. at 695, 345 F.2d at 813.
65 Ibid.
66 Brief for Petitioner, p. 2.
67 384 U.S. 424 (1966).
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cause it had disposed "of the appeal on another ground."' The Court
felt that its decision was consistent with Bianchi and would result in
the utilization of administrative procedures to which the parties had
contractually agreed. In addition, the Court considered its decision re-
flective of both the congressional intent in the Wunderlich Act and a
long line of Supreme Court decisions. Resort to administrative proce-
dures, the Court noted, is an "expeditious way to settle disputes" and
could "enhance the possibility of harmonious agreement" while lead-
ing "to greater uniformity in the important business of fairly interpret-
ing government contracts.""
The Court noted that there may be occasions when the parties
will not be required to exhaust the administrative procedure, but "these
circumstances are clearly the exceptions rather than the rule and the
inadequacy or unavailability of administrative relief must clearly ap-
pear before a party is permitted to circumvent his own contractual
agreement!'
VI. THE PRESENT SITUATION
A. Court of Claims Review
Both prior and subsequent to the Wunderlich Act, the Court of
Claims in its review of administrative decisions under the disputes
clause had acted as a trial rather than appellate court.11 In recent
years, the court has attempted to outline a judicial procedure which
accords with the letter and spirit of both the Wunderlich Act and the
Bianchi decision. Quite frequently, the initial procedural question is
whether Bianchi applies to the case under review." This question is
considered by a Commissioner who makes findings and submits an
opinion for the approval of the court. The history of the "Bianchi
rulings" by the court, however, did not result in criteria that could be
applied uniformly and with certainty. Whether Bianchi applied and
the extent of its application depended on facts such as the following:
whether there had been a "waiver"; whether a question of law was
involved; whether the dispute was one "arising under the contract"
or "outside of the contract"; whether the majority of the claims in-
volved breaches of contract; and whether a party was bound by the
doctrine of estoppel.
62 Id. at 430.
69 Id. at 429.
70 Id. at 430. The Court also said that its holding necessarily disapproved of cases
in which the Court of Claims retained the issue of damages (not previously considered
administratively) after it reversed the administrative finding of no liability. Id. at 430-31
n.6.
77 See, e.g., Volentine & Littleton v. United States, 136 Ct. Cl. 638, 145 F. Supp.
952 (1956).
72 See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
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Prior to the decision in Bianchi, the court had permitted de novo
evidence on questions of fact, regardless of whether the relevant claim
had been decided under the disputes clause. At that time, the adminis-
trative record made was not of primary importance; rather, the sig-
nificant factor was that there had been no failure to exhaust adminis-
trative remedies under the disputes clause." The Bianchi decision
changed this by precluding the Court of Claims from taking de novo
evidence on issues covered by the disputes clause. The Supreme Court's
Utah and Anthony Grace decisions clarify the Bianchi doctrine and
establish that, for cases within the scope of the disputes clause, the
facts are to be found administratively."
In its decisions since Utah and Anthony Grace, the Court of
Claims has apparently recognized that when relief is available to a
contractor under a disputes clause, he is not entitled to a trial de novo
on factual questions decided administratively." In some of its recent
proceedings, the Court of Claims has required the plaintiff to file
a detailed statement assigning errors of law allegedly committed by
the Board of Appeals. The court has also required a declaration of the
specific findings which the plaintiff contends were not supported by
substantial evidence."
The Court of Claims has recognized that as a result of the Utah
and Anthony Grace decisions, it may be necessary to return pending
cases to administrative boards for a determination of the amount of
damages due the contractor."
These recent Court of Claims decisions indicate that the court
has changed its position regarding the manner in which the Bianchi
decision should be applied. Hopefully, the guidance given by the Su-
preme Court in Utah and Anthony Grace has ended the need in prac-
tically every contract case in the Court of Claims to litigate the proce-
dural issue of whether there should be a de novo hearing.
Utah and Anthony Grace have eliminated much of the uncer-
tainty regarding the finality to be accorded those facts which have
been properly determined by the administrative body. Now it is clear
73 See, e.g., United States v. Blair, 321 U.S. 730 (1944) ; United States v. Callahan
Walker Constr. Co., 317 U.S. 56 (1942).
74 Even prior to Utah and Anthony Grace, the Court of Claims recognized this
limitation in Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. United States, 170 Ct. Cl. 757, 345 F.2d 833
(1965).
75 See, e.g., Midwest Spray & Coating Co. v. United States, Ct. Cl. No. 354-64
(July 15, 1966) ; Jefferson Constr. Co. v. United States, Ct. CI. No. 67-65 (July 15, 1966) ;
Banks Constr. Co. v. United States, Ct. Cl. No. 17-64 (July 15, 1966) ; Allied Contractors,
Inc. v. United States, Ct. Cl. No. 255-61 (July 15, 1966).
76 See Keco Indus., Inc. v. United States, Ct. Cl. No. 277-56 (July 15, 1966).
77 See, e.g., Robertson Elec. Co. v. United States, Ct. Cl. No. 12-64 (July 15, 1966) ;
Mauricio Hochschild, Inc. v. United States, Ct. Cl. No. 276-63 (July 15, 1966). Compare
Thompson Ramo Wooldridge, Inc. v. United States, 361 F.2d 222 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
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that if administrative relief is available under the terms of the con-
tract, the disputes procedure is mandatory, and all fact findings relat-
ing to the claim must be made administratively. Such findings (subject
to Wunderlich Act standards)" bind a court in any future litigation
involving the same facts. If no relief is available administratively, the
contractor can seek a judicial remedy.
This distribution of responsibility between the courts and the
boards has resolved one major problem and accentuated another.
Faced with the prospect of having their court actions dismissed for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies, contractors feel compelled
to present all claims relating to the contract first to the contracting
officer and then to the appeals board." To the extent that the contract
does not allow administrative relief, presentation to the administrative
body is clearly useless, since the contractor's only remedy would be a
judicial one. This division of claims has been referred to as "fragmen-
tation of remedies.' The Utah and Anthony Grace decisions vividly
indicate the necessity of avoiding this problem by providing a con-
tractual basis that allows an administrative remedy. These two cases
should, however, end the "fragmentation" that resulted from de novo
trials which were granted simply because a claim was couched in
breach of contract language. Both the Bianchi and Utah decisions
recognized that the purpose of the Wunderlich Act "would be frus-
trated if either side were free to withhold evidence at the administra-
tive level and then to introduce it in a judicial proceeding." 8 ' The
judicial relitigation of an issue decided administratively frustrates the
use of the disputes clause as a "mechanism whereby adjustments may
be made and errors corrected on an administrative level, thereby per-
mitting the Government to mitigate or avoid large damage claims that
might otherwise be created."'
The Utah and Anthony Grace decisions notwithstanding, there
are circumstances in which the Court of Claims can grant a de novo
hearing. The court presumably has the authority to determine what
constitutes a claim for breach of contract and the extent to which that
claim overlaps with those more appropriate for administrative relief.
The court would also have the authority to determine whether given
administrative findings were relevant to a claim within the jurisdiction
" Supra pp. 3-4.
79 United States v. Holpuch, 328 U.S. 234 (1946) ; United States v. Blair, 321 U.S. 730
(1944) ; Henry E. Wile Co. v. United States, 144 Ct. Cl. 394, 169 F. Supp. 249 (1959) ;
Southeastern Oil Fla., Inc. v. United States, 127 Ct. Cl. 480, 115 F. Supp. 198 (1953).
Compare Universal Ecsco Corp. v. United States, 170 Ct. Cl. 809, 345 F.2d 586 (1965).
89 See generally Crowell and Anthony, Practical Problems Facing Contractors'
Counsel as a Result of Fragmentation of Remedies, 18 Ad. L. Rev. 128 (Fall 1965).
m United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709, 717 (1963).
82 United States v. Holpuch Co., supra note 79, at 239.
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of the appeals board. Claims, however, do not come in packages neatly
labeled "breach" and "contract," and there may be some difficult
cases." In addition, there is nothing to prevent a contractor from
electing to bypass the disputes procedure when an alleged breach is
involved, or when there are no "facts" in dispute. Since the disputes
clause is not applicable in these situations, the Court of Claims would
conduct a de novo hearing.
B. Some Potential Problems
Basis for Administrative Jurisdiction. Government contracts
typically contain a number of clauses which permit certain actions
that would constitute a breach of contract to be treated administra-
tively under the disputes clause." In Utah, the Supreme Court makes
it clear that the parties may contractually agree to apply the disputes
clause procedure to breach of contract situations, subject to the limita-
tions imposed by the Wunderlich Act. In fact, the Court discusses with
apparent approval past and present efforts to develop standard clauses
which would encourage an administrative rather than judicial remedy
for what would otherwise be a breach of contract." In addition, Con-
tract Appeal Boards have developed doctrines which afford a contrac-
tor administrative relief for many types of Government conduct which
83 It is often argued, for example, that the failure to order a change and grant an
equitable adjustment, when a change in fact has been required by the contracting officer,
constitutes a breach of contract. In some instances, the boards have ordered the contract-
ing officer to make the adjustment, treating the requirement of the contracting officer as
a constructive change. E.g., Noonan Constr. Co., 1963 B.C.A. 3638 (ASBCA); Aero
Serv. Corp., 1958-1 B.C.A. ¶ 1683 (ASBCA). The Court of Claims has treated similar
claims as a change or a changed condition and granted an equitable adjustment. E.g.,
Jack Stone Co. v. United States, 170 Ct. Cl. 281, 344 F.2d 370 (1965); E. H. Sales, Inc.
v. United States, 169 Ct. Cl. 269, 340 F.2d 358 (1965); Hoffman v. United States, 166
Ct. Cl. 39, 340 F.2d 645 (1964); Globe Indem. Co. v. United States, 102 Ct. Cl. 21
(1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 852 (1945). See generally Leventhal, Public Contracts and
Administrative Law, 52 A.B.A.J. 35 (1966); Spector, An Analysis of the Standard
"Changes" Clause, 25 Fed. B.J. 177 (1965).
34 These clauses include: "Changes"; "Changed Conditions"; "Suspension of Work";
"Government-Furnished Property"; "Delay-Damages"; "Termination for Convenience."
The net result of these clauses is a diminishing number of claims that are not considered
to arise under the contract.
85 384 U.S. at 417-18. There was a "suspension of work" clause in the Utah con-
tract, but apparently the contractor and the AEC Advisory Board on Contract Appeals
considered that the clause had no application to any of the claims presented. That clause,
however, authorizes the contracting officer to pay the costs incurred by the contractor
as a result of delays caused by the Government. Only Judge Cowen, concurring in the
Court of Claims' opinion, noted that a decision as to the application of that clause might
have an important bearing on the questions to be decided. He stated that since only the
Commissioner's order was being reviewed, "this case in its present posture [does not
present] ... the proper vehicle for laying down hard and fast rules to resolve all of the
important issues urged upon us by the parties." 168 Ct. Cl. at 536-37, 339 F.2d at 615.
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could be considered a breach of contracts° With some exceptions,'
however, the boards have usually refused to grant relief on "pure"
breach of contract claims.'
The fact that the boards have continued to recognize the dichot-
omy between administrative relief and breach of contract relief for
certain claims contributes to the existing problem. There are several
reasons why they decide that certain claims are not subject to ad-
ministrative determination.
The instances in which boards most often say they have no juris-
diction to grant monetary relief are claims for unliquidated damages
due to delay caused by the Government. The refusal of boards to grant
such relief is primarily a reflection of what is known as the "Rice doc-
trine," which developed from several Supreme Court decisions." The
doctrine has been stated as follows:
For the reasonable cost and expenses of the changes made
in the construction, payment was to be made; but for any
increase in the cost of the work not changed, no provision
was made . . . . [W]ithout any such provision he must be
held to have taken the risk of the prices of the labor and
materials which he was bound to furnish, as every other con-
tractor does who agrees to do a specified job at a fixed price.
It is one of the elements which he takes into account when
he makes his bargain, and he cannot expect the other party
to guarantee him against unfavorable changes in those
prices."
Although there is great variance in the administrative application
of the Rice doctrine, the majority of the board decisions have cited
it as a basis for refusing to allow damages for delay caused by the
Government." The Court of Claims, on the other hand, has construed
88 See Cuneo and Crowell, Parallel Jurisdiction: If the Court of Claims Can, Why
Not the Administrative Boards? 33 Fordham L. Rev. 137 (1964).
87 The National Aeronautics and Space Administration Board of Contract Appeals
apparently asserts jurisdiction over certain claims for breach of contract. Doyle & Rus-
sell, Inc., NASABCA No. 51, 1965-2 B.C.A. 4912. See Fick Foundry Co., AECBCA
No. 10, 1965-2 B.C.A. 5052.
88 See, e.g., Metrig Corp., ASBCA No. 8455, 1963 B.CA. 3658; Simmel-Industrie
Meccanchie Sodeta per Azioni, ASBCA No. 6141, 1961-1 B.C.A. ¶ 2917.
" United States v. Howard P. Foley Co., 329 U.S. 64 (1946); United States v.
Blair, 321 U.S. 730 (1944); United States v. Rice, 317 U.S. 61 (1942); H. E. Crook Co.
v. United States, 270 U.S. 4 (1926); Chouteau v. United States 95 U.S. 61 (1877).
8° Id. at 68.
81 See, e.g., Electronic & Missile Facilities, Inc., ASBCA No. 9866, 1966-1 B.C.A.
¶ 5307; Model Eng'r & Mfg. Corp., ASBCA No. 7490, 1962 B.C.A. 3363; Craig Instru-
ments Corp., ASBCA No 6385, 1961-1 B.CA. tl 2875. Compare A. L. Harding, Inc., DCAB
No. PR-44, 1965-2 B.CA. 5261; Northeastern Eng'r Inc., ASBCA No. 5732, 1961-1
B.C.A. l[ 3026.
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the doctrine to present no obstacle when relief is sought in that court."
In any event, the Rice doctrine is based upon an interpretation of lan-
guage used in contract clauses," and it need not be a basis for limita-
tions on administrative jurisdiction over delay claims."
Another reason why boards refuse to consider pure breach of
contract claims is their fear that the agencies may lack authority to
pay such claims should they favorably decide them. The Supreme
Court has held that the general authority of executive departments to
enter into and administer contracts includes the authority to settle and
pay claims for breach of contract." The Court of Claims, in recent
decisions, has also held that executive departments have general au-
thority to settle claims for breach of contract's The Comptroller Gen-
eral of the United States, however, has taken the position that his office
has sole authority to settle claims for breach of contract."
The role of the General Accounting Office in contract disputes
is not always understood. Under the Budget and Accounting Act of
1921 98 and the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950, 99 the
Comptroller General of the United States, as head of the General
Accounting Office and an agent of Congress, has authority to examine
and audit the financial transactions of the Government. Section 305
of the 1921 act provides that all claims and demands by or against the
Government and all accounts in which the Government is interested
either as a debtor or creditor shall be settled and adjusted in the Gen-
92 See, e.g., J. D. Hedin Constr. Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d 235 (Ct. Cl. 1965);
F. H. McGraw & Co. v. United States, 131 Ct. Cl. 501, 130 F. Supp. 394 (1955).
In one recent decision, the court said:
Time and events have somewhat eroded the much-maligned doctrine of
United States v. Rice, 317 U.S. 61 (1942) . . . but even granting its continued
health and vitality its restriction of a contractor to a mere time extension as full
contract payment for the financial consequences of reasonable delay flowing
from a change order does not apply to preclude monetary damages for that
part of a delay found to be unreasonable.
Gardner Displays Co. v. United States, 346 F.2d 585, 588-89 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
93 See United States v. Rice, supra note 89, at 66.
94 See Clark, Government Caused Delays in the Performance of Federal Contracts:
The Impact of the Contract Clauses, 22 Military L. Rev. 1 (1963); Shedd, The Rice
Doctrine and the Ripple Effects of Changes, 32 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 62 (1963); Speck,
Delays-Damages on Government Contracts: Constructive Conditions and Administrative
Remedies, 26 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 505 (1958). The General Services Administration has
recently coordinated an interagency study which, among other things, recommends con-
tract clause changes to alleviate the impact of the Rice doctrine.
95 United States v. Corliss Steam-Engine Co., 91 U.S. 321 (1875).
96 E.g., Brock & Blevins Co. v. United States, 170 Ct. Cl. 52, 343 F.2d 951 (1965).
97 44 Decs. Comp. Gen. 353 (1965). In this opinion, the Comptroller General relied
on the decision of the Court of Claims in Utah Constr. & Mining Co. v. United States,
168 Ct. Cl. 522, 339 F.2d 606 (1964).
93 Ch. 18, 42 Stat. 20 (1921) (codified in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.).
99 Ch. 946, 64 Stat. 832 (1950) (codified in scattered sections of 16, 24, 31, 39 U.S.C.).
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eral Accounting Office.'" Section 304 of the same act authorizes dis-
bursing offices, and the heads of departments and establishments, to
apply to the Comptroller General for a decision on any question in-
volving a payment to be made by them or under their authority. The
provisions of 31 U.S.C. § 81 authorize certifying officers to obtain a
decision of the Comptroller General on any question of law involved
in the payment on any vouchers presented to them for certification.
There are apparently two practical reasons why the General
Accounting Office feels that its rules against administrative settlement
of breach of contract claims are necessary and proper to protect the
Government's interest.'" First, whether there has been an actionable
breach on the part of the Government is an unusually difficult ques-
tion. Second, the procedure provided for administrative settlement is
inadequate, since such claims must be settled under the disputes pro-
cedure which is a "one-way street" in that it protects only the rights
of the contractors.
In view of the authority which the General Accounting Office may
exercise, its opinion that there is no administrative authority to settle
breach of contract claims certainly would not encourage boards to
expand their jurisdiction into that area.
Government contracts typically contain several standard clauses
that permit the Government to take certain action which would other-
wise be a breach of contract. These clauses explicitly authorize the
contracting officer to make an equitable adjustment with the contrac-
tor. No one has questioned the right of the agencies to enter into
contracts with such clauses. It would therefore appear that contracting
agencies have the authority to grant relief from a breach of contract
by the Government. In any event, there should be administrative juris-
diction to make factual determinations in these breach of contract
matters, and if there is any question as to the agency's authority to
pay, the case can be referred to the General Accounting Office for
resolution on the basis of the administrative findings.
Another possible source of confusion is the failure of some boards,
despite the broad scope of their charters, to recognize that jurisdiction
and finality are separate and distinct matters.'" The standards of
review set out in the Wunderlich Act and incorporated into the dis-
putes clause have nothing to do with administrative jurisdiction. These
100 When the Department of Justice assumes responsibility for the defense of a
suit, it has the unquestioned authority to settle the case. See Exec. Order No. 6166 (June
10, 1933).
101 Address by J. E. Welch, Deputy General Counsel, General Accounting Office,
before Government Contracts Committee, District of Columbia Bar Association, Jan. 13,
1966.
102 See Joy, The Disputes Clause in Government Contracts: A Survey of Court and
Administrative Decisions, 25 Fordham L. Rev. 11, 20-22 (1956).
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standards concern only the degree of finality to be accorded a board's
findings. Administrative decisions on questions of law are permitted
where necessary for the complete adjudication of the issue.'
Administrative Due Process. The Administrative Procedure Ace"
does not apply to disputes procedures and there is no government-wide
standard for administrative due process in these proceedings. The
legislative history of the Wunderlich Act indicates that one of the
reasons for including the standard "not supported by substantial evi-
dence" was to encourage improvement in administrative proceedings
under the disputes clause.'"
Many of the Boards of Contract Appeals have published detailed
rules of procedure. Despite the apparent adequacy of these procedures,
they have been challenged by the Court of Claims. In its Utah hold-
ing,'"the court emphasized that
. . . neither the contracting officer nor the bead of the de-
partment, or his representative, is a judicial tribunal created
by Act of Congress; they derive their authority solely from
the contract between the parties, and their authority is lim-
ited by the terms of the contract . . . .
. . . .
[T]here is a compelling reason to strictly limit the contract
to its precise terms. It is well known that anyone seeking a
contract with the Government must be willing to agree to
accept the contract drawn by the Government . . . . An
appeal from the findings and decision of the contracting
officer is allowed to the head of the department, but he, too,
is an officer of the Government, the opposite contracting
party. This is an additional and a cogent reason for limiting
this provision of the contract to its precise terms?'
This lack of government-wide standards to assure administrative due
process in disputes cases may have been another reason for the court's
efforts to provide de novo judicial trials in many cases.
109 See, e.g., Morrison-Knudson Co. v. United States, supra note 74. See generally
Birnbaum, Questions of Law and Fact and the Jurisdiction of the Armed Services Board of
Contract Appeals, 19 Fed. B.J. 120 (1959); Spector, "Law" Is Where You Find It, or
"Fact" Is in the Eyes of the Beholder, 19 Fed. B.J. 212 (1959).
104 60 Stat. 237 (1946), as amended, 5 U.S.C. 	 1001-11 (1964). Rulemaking in the
field of government contracts is specifically exempted from section 1003 of the act; section
1004 of that act, covering adjudication, does not apply because there is no separate statute
invoking it.
105 H.R. Rep. No. 1380, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1954).
106 Utah Constr. Co. v. United States, supra note 97.
107 Id. at 528-30, 339 F.2d at 611-12.
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VII. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS AND SOME SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS
A. Some Points of Departure
In view of the differences of opinion concerning the extent to
which the disputes clause authorizes Government agencies to make
binding determinations of fact, and the diverse interests which are
affected, it should be recognized that anyone suggesting changes in
this area may be engaged in a "dangerous game." 108
 The general
situation examined in this article suggests the need for consideration
of revisions in the present system that would be beneficial to all par-
ties. The fundamental principles guiding any change should be: (1)
the preservation of the basic objectives of the disputes procedure—
the resolution of the dispute at one trial in which administrative due
process affords a fair determination of the issues involved; and, (2)
the maintenance of the necessary safeguard of judicial review.
Others have suggested changes ranging from abolition of the
present system to a continuation of the status quo, with increased
action by the boards themselves to achieve their own parallel juris-
diction with the Court of Claims.' 0 B
B. Current Congressional Study
The United States Senate Select Committee on Small Business,
through its Subcommittee on Government Procurement, conducted a
recently published study of the effectiveness of contract appeals pro-
cedures.11°
Among other things, the congressional study focused on the
108 See Spector, Is It "Bianchi's Ghost"—or "Much Ado About Nothing," 29 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 87, 114 (1964).
109 Sec, e.g., Note, Government Contracts Disputes: An Institutional Approach, 73
Yale L.J. 1408, 1454 (1964). One proposal made in this note would abolish appeals boards'
and Court of Claims' jurisdiction, and substitute a hearing officer and an appellate court
unaffiliated with any department or agency.
It has been argued that administrative boards can now, without anything being
done, assume parallel jurisdiction with the Court of Claims. Cuneo and Crowell, supra note
86. Also, legislation has been proposed in the House of Representatives, H.R. 8402, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), which would overcome the effects of the Bianchi case by providing
that "no provision of any contract entered into by the United States . . . shall serve to
limit in any manner any judicial proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction relating
to" a dispute arising under a contract.
110 Operation and Effectiveness of Government Boards of Contract Appeals, S. Doc.
No. 89, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) [hereinafter cited as S. Doc. No. 89]. The study was
under the direction of Professor Harold C. Petrowitz of the Washington College of Law
of American University. The Subcommittee held hearings on March 8 and 9, 1966, at
which witnesses from both inside and outside the Government gave their recommendations
on steps needed to improve the disputes procedure. Hearings Before a Subcommittee on
the Operation and Effectiveness of Government Boards of Contract Appeals of the
Senate Select Committee on Small Business, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
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amount of responsibility that should be entrusted to an administrative
body engaged in adjudication. The composition of boards, and the
procedures followed by them, were examined to see whether parties
are afforded a fair and complete hearing and whether an adequate case
record is developed for judicial review?"
In general, witnesses appearing before the subcommittee indi-
cated that boards of contract appeals have been functioning well, as
judged by the quality of the hearings conducted and the decisions
rendered. Witnesses urged that board hearings be consistent with
administrative due process. In this regard, several suggestions were
made: board members should not be associated with the agency's
General Counsel; boards should be given the authority to issue sub-
poenas; reasonable discovery proceedings should be available to the
parties as a matter of right; efforts should be made to have the rules
of the various boards of contract appeals made more uniform; and
boards should adopt a rule of procedure, similar to that contained in
Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that
all facts be found specially and be stated clearly and succinctly. The
testimony of most witnesses confirmed that the Bianchi decision has
done much to alert both contractors and the Government to the im-
portance of disputes procedures.'"
The report of the investigating staff, after comprehensive survey
of government officials and private contractors, concluded that exist-
ing boards are "doing a pretty good job and that appeals are handled
with reasonable fairness."'"
The study recommended certain procedural changes in the exist-
ing board structure."' These relatively minor changes concerned board
composition, methods of recruiting and compensating board members,
and procedures for handling appeals and discovery. The only recom-
mended change that would require statutory authorization is the
granting of the subpoena power to the boards.'" The study considered
and rejected both a transitional and a statutory approach which could
result in an entirely new administrative structure."'
111 Remarks by Senator Montoya, Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Small
Business, at Opening of Hearings, March 8, 1966.
112 The most far-reaching recommendations were offered by the General Accounting
Office whose representative said that his office would support legislation designed to:
replace the present appeals boards with two or three government-wide boards; have
board members appointed by the Civil Service Commission rather than by the contracting
agencies; and provide for a right of appeal on behalf of the Government. See also Note,
Bianchi, The Court of Claims, and Trial De Novo, 54 Geo. L.J. 644 (1966).
113 S. Doc. No. 89 at 131.
114 Id. at 147.
115 Id. at 156.
nti Id. at 147.
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C. Some Specific Suggestions
It is submitted that implementation of the following proposals
will substantially improve the established system for the orderly
resolution of contract disputes.
1. Expand the Contractual Basis for Administrative Determina-
tion and Relief. The disputes procedure apparently has been accepted
by contractors, and there has been no significant criticism of the
process. Approximately 1000 cases are handled annually under the
disputes procedure, but only a small percentage of these are appealed
administratively, and an even smaller percentage reach the courts.
The problems discussed in this article arise primarily in litigation, and
this results in comparatively few cases. Since the disputes procedure
has apparently served its function well, it should be preserved and im-
proved as necessary to protect the interest of both the Government and
the contractor.
The fragmentation of remedies problem could be avoided, at least
to the extent practical, if the Government and the contractor initially
agreed to resolve all factual issues, including those relating to breach
of contract, through the disputes machinery. An administrative trial
has an undeniable advantage in timing, and increases the possibility
of settlement. Issues will be heard sooner, so witnesses should be able
to recall facts more clearly than if their testimony had to be delayed
until a full judicial trial.
It was suggested earlier in this article"' that the differentiation
between administrative relief and breach of contract relief may be
a reason for the attitude of the Court of Claims toward de novo hear-
ings. In order to minimize this dichotomy, government contracts
should include clauses clearly committing to administrative jurisdic-
tion the resolution of all disputes connected with the contract, subject
of course to judicial review under the Wunderlich Act. This modifica-
tion would permit administrative settlement of many disputes which
must now be heard at the court level.
This recommendation can be accomplished by: revising the
"changed conditions" and "changes" clauses so that they clearly
provide a contractual basis for the payment of damages resulting from
government-caused delays; including a "suspension of work" clause in
all contracts; and developing other clauses which may be needed to
provide a contractual basis for complete administrative relief. To
ensure full implementation of the objective—administrative resolu-
tion of contract claims—the disputes clause itself should be revised
to eliminate any ambiguity regarding the scope of administrative
jurisdiction. One alternative would be the removal of the phrase "con-
117 Supra p. 16.
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cerning a question of fact arising under this contract." This would
clarify the basis for administrative jurisdiction, yet not affect the
finality rule as enunciated in the Wunderlich Act.
2. Establish Guidelines for Administrative Due Process. If there
is to be but one administrative trial, there must be well-established
guidelines to assure that it is a fair one. As was suggested earlier, the
Court of Claims' apparent concern about inadequacies in the adminis-
trative decisional process may be a factor behind that court's prefer-
ence for de novo trials."' In some situations a similar concern may
influence the contractor whose claim fails before a contract appeals
board. In other circumstances, an allegation of inadequate adminis-
trative processes may be merely a tactical maneuver used in present-
ing a claim to the court. These problems could be minimized by
implementation of government-wide standards with respect to the
creation, membership, and status of appeals boards, together with
appropriate procedural guidelines assuring administrative due process
in the conduct of disputes proceedings. Establishment of uniform rules
to govern the boards, their membership, and status, would require
careful study,' but the basic requirements for fair and complete
administrative hearings have been developed in the Administrative
Procedure Act.'
The foundation of the disputes procedure is—and should remain
—the agreement of the parties to the contract. This should not, how-
ever, inhibit the adoption of the suggested rules and standards. Nor
would such rules and standards need to be the subject of specific legis-
lation, since the departments involved could themselves introduce the
desired improvements. The boards could develop and institute some
new procedures; the Court of Claims could furnish in its decisions
guidelines for administrative due process; the Department of Justice
could establish guidelines for agencies and departments to follow; and
the General Services Administration could provide guidance through
the Federal Procurement Regulations."'
A variation on these recommendations would be the creation of
a completely separate contract appeals board for handling disputes
under all government contracts, regardless of the agency involved.
This might minimize some of the problems (real or fancied) associated
118 Supra p. 21. Although the Court of Claims has generally been critical of the
administrative due process followed in disputes cases, it has dealt with the problem only
rarely. One such instance occurred when the court adopted the Commissioner's opinion
in Allen Sr Whalen, Inc. v. United States, 347 F.2d 992 (Ct. Cl. 1965). In this case, the
court severely criticized the procedures followed by an appeals board. See Roberts v.
United States, 357 F.2d 938 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Crowell & Anthony, supra note 80, at 132-33.
119 See the recommendations in S. Doc. No. 89, at 147-62.
120 60 Stat. 237 (1946), as amended, 5 U.S.C. 	 1001-11 (1964).
121 41 C.F.R. ch. 1 (1966).
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with individual agency boards, and might accelerate implementation
of the appropriate due process requirements. Such a consolidation,
however, would pose other problems, and might well destroy the basic
virtues of the disputes procedure by extending the decision time and
removing the agency involved from direct participation in the disputes
process. The general acceptability of existing procedures, considered
in terms of decisions subsequently litigated, does not indicate the need
for such a drastic departure from the present system.
3. Clarify the Function of Judicial Review of Administrative
Decisions. Giving an agency full authority to decide disputes adminis-
tratively should resolve many of the existing jurisdictional problems
which have resulted in unnecessarily duplicative trials. If the ad-
ministrative trial is to be at all conclusive, the reviewing court must
act in an appellate capacity and not as a court of original jurisdiction.
An appellate proceeding is designed to correct errors made in the court
below and not to review generally the entire case. The appellate court
must make its decision based on the "record," without considering new
facts, and without imposing its own judgment on conflicting evidence
reasonably resolved by the tribunal below.'"
Obviously a court of review should not be unconditionally limited
to "a frozen record from below"'" when a contractor alleges fraud
on the part of the deciding body. If fraud is alleged, the administrative
record is meaningless. If a contractor claims that a decision is capri-
cious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad
faith, a court should not be limited to the record from below. How-
ever, a court should not completely ignore that record and commence
a de novo trial. The court should require the contractor to apply for
leave to adduce additional evidence and to establish to the satisfaction
of the court that such additional evidence would be material to the
allegations.
If a contractor alleges that the decision of the administrative
tribunal is not supported by substantial evidence, the appellate court
should be restricted to the "frozen record from below," since in de-
ciding the question it would be acting solely in an appellate capacity.
As a corollary to broadening the authority of the agencies, the
rules of practice of the Court of Claims should be revised to reflect
the appellate nature of its review of agency decisions.'" It would
appear that the Court of Claims, under its broad rulemaking power,'"
could do this on its own initiative.
It is submitted that if these recommendations are implemented,
122 Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition—Deciding Appeals 28 (1960).
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the role of the appeals boards and of the courts in resolving disputes
cases will be greatly clarified. This clarification should result in the
more orderly disposition of disputes under government contracts, while
retaining the objectives of the established procedure—a speedy but
fair and complete administrative remedy which preserves the necessary
safeguard of judicial review of the administrative record.
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